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IN'IRODUCTION 
International tensions presently facing the United States 
threaten to make the 1980's one of the most significant decades in the 
history of the United States. Examples of the tensions that endanger 
American interests in the international arena are plentiful. Differences 
with our European allies and unrest in El Salvador are prime illustrations 
of these tensions. 
The Middle 'East, which has always been of great interest to the 
United States, will be the area of greatest consequence, while also being 
the most difficult problem for the United States to deal with. The Middle 
East's imJ)Ortance as a region stems from these facts 1 
(1
2
) America's need for Middle Eastern oil will continue and 
( ) The Middle East is strategically important because it 
is the crossroads to three continents. This strategic consideration 
becomes even more crucial when recent moves into the area by the 
Soviet Union are taken into account. 
The basic premise of this paper is that American diplomacy in 
the Middle East always has been and will continue to be a dilemma for 
the United States. The creation of the State of Israel intensified 
this dilemma. 
The problem facing the United States is that its interests in 
the Middle East are best served by a resolution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict which has plagued the area for over thirty years. The dilemma 
1 
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becomes apparent when it is realized that no resolution to the Arab-
Israeli dispute can be reached until a successful solution to the 
Palestinian Problem has been achieved. Even a partial settlement to 
this problem cannot be reached until all the varied factions involved 
agree to sit down at the same table and talk. 
Realizing this, American policymakers should direct their 
efforts in the Middle East toward finding a solution to the Palestinian 
Problem. 'nle search for this solution is the main focus of this study. 
This search for the possible solutions to the Palestinian 
Problem will begin with a short history of the problem that ranges from 
just prior to the first Arab-Israeli War to shortly before the onset of 
President Carter's term in office in 1977. 
The study will continue with a section that examines the parts 
played by the Arab countries and Israel in the problem and how the 
Palestinians themselves fit into the picture. The next segment of the 
paper looks at some of the people and groups who either claim to be or 
are recognized as the representatives of the Palestinian people and at 
recent United States' diplomacy concerning the Palestinian Problem. 
The major emphasis of this paper will be on ths United States' 
diplomacy dealing with the problem during the Carter administration and 
beyond. The Camp David Peace Accords will be of special significance 
here. The policies of the Reagan administration will also be critiqued. 
This study will conclude with a section that makes some sugges-
tions on how the United States should proceed in finding a solution to 
the Palestinian Problem. 
SOURCES OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBIEM 
The roots of the Palestinian Problem can be compared to the 
roots of a large tree, Both kinds of roots are hidden and become 
entangled or gnarled. The roots of the Palestinian Problem have 
become so entangled that there is virtually no agreement on the causes 
of the problem, One of the major obstacles to reaching a solution to 
the problem is the lack of agreement as to what caused the problem. 
The distance between parties to the dispute is highlighted by some of 
the extreme positions taken in the argument. One position maintains 
that there really are no Palestinians or any Palestinian Problem. 
The belief that there is no problem is, of course, ludicrous. 
According to the people involved, the one thing they can agree on is 
that some Palestinians did leave Palestine. Aside from this one 
agreement there has been no common ground between the parties until 
very recently. Each side to the argument has its own theory as to 
why the Palestinian exodus took place and its own theory about which 
side has legitimate rights to the land that was called Palestine. 
The major parties involved in the problem are the Israelis, 
the Arab states that harbor Palestinian refugees, and the Palestinians 
themselves. Palestinian participation in a resolution of the problem 
has been hindered by the fact that they do not have their own state. 
The question over Palestinian re~resentation has also kept the 
4 
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Palestinians out of any direct attempts at finding a solution to their 
uroblem, Although the plight of the Palestinians intensified when 
Israel won the first Arab-Israeli War, the Palestinian Problem really 
began in the late 1800's before there ever was a state of Israel. 
Prior to 1947, the land that is now occupied by the state of 
Israel was called Palestine. Palestine was inhabited by both Arabs 
and Jews, with Arabs in the majority. 1 The British ruled Palestine 
under the authority of a mandate given them by the League of Nations 
in April, 1920. During February of 1947 the British government 
announced it was not going to continue ruling Palestine. This 
annou.'"lcement created a vacuum that brought the dispute over Palestine 
to a head. 
Before the British announcement both Jews and Arabs were 
making claims to Palestine. The Jews, behind a movement called 
Zionism, declared that Palestine was to become the national home for 
Jews. Zionists believed that the British gave them permission to 
create a Jewish national home in Palestine. The Zionists cited the 
Balfour Declaration of 1918 as proof of their claim. This national 
home was to become the state of Israel. The creation of the state of 
Israel was the prime cause of the first Arab-Israeli War. As a result 
of this war, many Palestinians became refugees in countries such as 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. 
This is where the theories of each side come into conflict. 
Two books bring out the conflicting positions of the Arabs and Israelis 
6 
very well. The two books are: The Question of Palestine by Edward 
w. Said2 which presents the Palestinian View and Battleground• Fact 
and Fantasy in Palestine by Samuel Katz3 which represents the Jewish 
side. 
The government of Israel believes that the Palestinians fled 
from Palestine in 1947 and 1948 under the orders of Arab leaders. The 
Arab leaders supposedly asked the Palestinian Arabs to leave their 
homes in Palestine so invading Arab armies could better attack Israel. 
Katz describes the situation this waya 
The Arabs are the only declared refugees who became 
refugees not by the action of their enemies or because of well-
grounded fear of their enemies, but by the initiative of their 
own leaders. For nearly a generation, those leaders have will-
fully kept as many people as they possibly could in a degenerating 
squalor, preventing their rehabilitation, and holding out to all 
of them the hope of return and of "vengeance" on the Jews of 4 Israel, to whom they have transferred the blame for their plight. 
The Palestinians, however, deny that they left Palestine 
because Arab leaders asked them to. Instead, they believe that they 
have been the innocent victims of Zionist imperialism. Zionism 
originated in Europe during the late 1800's as a response to the long-
standing discrimination of Jews. This discrimination intensified in 
the twentieth century and led to the formation of a movement for the 
establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. This movement 
was founded by Theodor Herzl in the 1890's and was called Zionism.5 
The problem with this view of Zionism was not the creation of 
a Jewish national home, but that it made no provision for the population 
7 
already in Palestine. Palestinians contend that the Zionists intended 
to just push them off the land. If this is true, how could the Zionists 
justify this action? Said explains it this way: 
As Herzl first conceived of it in the nineties, Zionism 
was a movement to free Jews and solve the problem of anti-semitism 
in the West; later elaborations of this idea took Palestine as the 
place where the conce'!'tion was to be materially fulfilled. In 
addition to being the place where there existed a spiritual bond 
in the form of a covenant between God and the Jews, Palestine had 
the further advantage of being a backward province in an even more 
backward empire. Therefore, the effort of all Zionist apologetics 
from the beginning was to lay claim to Palestine both as a backward, 
largely uninhabited territory and as a place where the Jews, enjoy-
ing a unique histo;ical privilege, could reconstitute the land into 
a Jewish homeland. 
Said goes on to say that it was always the plan of the Zionist 
movement to deny the existence o:f any Palestinian Arab population in 
Palestine. He statesa 
It is more likely that there will remain the inverse 
resistance which has characterized Zionism and Israel since the 
beginning: the refusal to admit, and the consequential denial of, 
the existence of Palestinian Arabs who are there not simply as an 
inconvenient nuisance, but as a nouulation with an indissoluble 
bond with the land.7 - -
Said is convinced that Palestine's :fate was never decided in 
Palestine. Instead, it was decided in Western capitals in Europe by 
men such as Theodor Herzl and Lord Rothschild. Their plan was to set 
up a Jewish national home in Palestine after having removed the popula-
tion already there. A section from the Complete Diaries of Theodor 
Herzl demonstrates what was to be done With this population: 
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We shall have to spirit the penniless population across the 
border by procuring emnloyment for it in the transit countries, 
while denying it any em~loyment in our own country. 
Both the process of expropriation and the remoSal of the 
noor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly. 
The Palestinian position in short is that they were pushed out 
of their homeland by Jews who were followers of a movement called 
Zionism that started in 1897 and resulted in the first Arab-Israeli 
War in 1948. Although the Palestinians have been out of Palestine only 
since the war in 1948, they feel that their plight really began with 
the formation of Zionism. 
They also feel that the Jews had little right to do this and 
that the Jewish government of Israel has conducted a campaign to keep 
the truth about their being forced out of Palestine by Zionism a 
secret. Said believes that ever since the formation of the state of 
Israel the Jewish government there has denied the existence of a 
Palestinian-Arab population in Palestine. Said says this campaign 
continues even today: 
For too many people who read the press, who watch tele-
vision and listen to the radio, who pretend to more than a 
smattering of political knowledge, who confess to expert opinions 
on international controversy, the Middle East is essentially the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and little more. There is a considerable 
reductiveness in this view, of course, but what is really wrong 
with it is that most of the time it literally blocks Palestine 
from having anything to do with the Middle East of today, which 
since September, 1978 seems entirely symbolized by Menachem Begin, 
Anwar al-5adat, and Jimmy Carter locked up together at Camp David, 
A considerable majority of the literature on the Middle East, at 
least until 1968, gives one the impression that the essence of 
what goes on in the Middle East is a series of unending wars 
between a group of Arab countries and Israel, That there had been 
such an entity as Palestine until 1948, or that Israel's existence -
its "independence" as the phrase goes - was the result of the 
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eradication of Palestine: of these truths beyond dispute most 
people who follow events in the Middle East are more or less 
:ignorant, or unaware. But what is most important is the continuing 
avoidance or ignorance of the existence today of about four million 
Muslim and Christian Arabs who are known to themselves and to 
others as Palestinians. They make up the question of Palestine, 
and if there is no country called Palestine it is not because 
there are no Palestinians.9 
According to the Palestinians, the Jews made Palestine their 
national homeland wrongfully and illegally. The Jews on the other hand 
say that they have a special religious right to Palestine. Jews claim 
that their rights and ties to Palestine have existed longer and are 
more important than any ties the Palestinians have. In order to justify 
this, the Jews claim that before they came into the area Palestine was 
nothing more than a political backwater that was lightly populated. 
Zionists contend that whatever population was there was inferior to the 
European Jews that would be migrating there. This fact was supposed to 
further justify the creation of the Jewish national homeland in Palestine. 
Zionists also claimed that the Palestinian belief that Jews had 
no right to Palestine because of the small Jewish presence there is 
erroneous. The Jews claim that they had both an emotional and physical 
presence in Palestine. Samuel Katz g1 ves an example of this physical 
presence a 
It is a continuity that waxed and waned, that moved in 
kaleidoscopic shifts, in response to the pressures of the foreign 
imperial rulers who in bewildering succession imposed themselves 
on the country. It is a pattern of stubborn refusal in the face 
of oppression, banishment and slaughter, to let go of an often 
tenuous hold in the country, a determined digging in sustained by 
a faith in the ultimate full restoration of which every Jew living 
in the homeland saw himself as caretaker and p.recursor.10 
10 
This physical presence has been denied by the Palestinians. 
The Palestinians, however, cannot deny that Jews living in Europe 
and other parts of the world were being discriminated against. Jews 
had thought of themselves as a people without a nation ever since the 
Jewish defeat and Diaspora in ?0 A.D. 
Zionism was a response to this discrimination. The thought of 
having a homeland in Palestine to escape to gave many Jews some hope in 
what would otherwise have been a hopeless situation. This was especially 
true after Hitler came to power in Germany and all through World War II. 
Here is an example of the form this hope assumed1 
Never in the periods of greatest persecution did the Jews 
as a people renounce that faith. ~rever in the periods of greatest 
peril to their very existence physically, and the seeming impos-
sibility of their ever regaining the land of Israel, did they seek 
a substitute for the homeland. Time after time throughout the 
centuries, there arose bold spirits who believed, or claimed, they 
had a plan, or a divine vision, for the restoration of the Jewish 
people to Palestine.11 
These same Jews, in addition to having the hope of returning to 
Palestine, also believed they had a better right to the land than any 
other group. They also believed that they were removed from the land 
illegally. Samuel Katz talks of how deep the feeling of a Jewish right 
to the land wentt 
But to the neople, the land - as it was called for all 
those centuries1 simply Ha'aretz, unchanging and irreplaceable. 
If ever a right has been maintained by unrelentin~ insistence on 
the claim, it was the Jewish right to Palestine.1 
Katz also talks about how the Jews feel their land was taken 
from them and how they never stopped thinking about it: 
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The Jews were never a people without a homeland. Having 
been robbed of their land, Jews never ceased to give expression to 
their anguish at their deprivation and to pray for and demand its 
return. Throughout the nearly two millennia of dispersion, 
Palestine remained the focus of the national cul tu:re. Every single 
day in all those seventy ~nerations, devout Jews gave voice to 
their attachment to Zion. 1J 
Samuel Katz reports that aside from believing they had a 
special right to the land, Jews also believed that the Arabs there did 
not take care of the land. Jews thought that since the Arabs did not 
think much of the land they did not have any right to 1 t. Katz makes 
these points clear in these passages: 
Palestine was never more than an unconsidered backwater of 
the empire. No great political or cul tu:ral center ever arose there 
to establish a source of Arab, or any other non-Jewish, affinity or 
attachment. 
To the Arab rulers and their non-Arab successors, Palestine 
was a battleground, a corridor, sometimes an outpost, its people a 
source of taxes and of some manpower for the waging of endless 
foreign and internecine wars ,14 
Katz finishes by saying: 
The Arabs did, however, play a significant and specific 
role in one aspect of Palestine's life: They contributed effect-
ively to its devastation. Where destruction and ruin were only 
partly achieved by warring imperial dynasties - by Arab, Turkish, 
Persians, or Egyptians, by the Crusaders or by invading hordes of 
Mongols of Kha.rezmians - it was supplemented by the revolts of 
local chieftains, by civil strife, by intertribal warfare within 
the population itself.15 
Palestinians respond to these claims by saying they had always 
lived on the land and loved it. They say their existence is tied to 
Palestine. Jews answer by saying: 
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There was never a. "Palestinian Arab" nation. To the Arab 
people as a. whole, no such entity a.s Palestine eXisted. To those 
of them who lived in its neighborhood, its lands were a suitable 
object for plunder and destruction. They were not conscious of 
any relationship to a. land and even the townsmen would have heard 
of its existence a.s a. land, if,they hea.rd of it at all, only from 
such Jews a.s they might meet.1o 
The historical digests given above demonstrate that the 
positions of Jews and Arabs are far apart, These differences existed 
even before the formation of the state of Israel and Israel's victory 
in the first Arab-Israeli War. 
I sra.el' s victory, however, did exacerbate the already tenuous 
situation, As a result of the war and I sra.eli victory, many Pales-
• 
tinians had to leave Palestine. These people went to other Arab 
countries ~~d became the Palestinian refugees. These refugees have 
become another factor in what wa.s an already serious problem. 
In addition to the arguments over which side has a right to 
the land, the refugees have created some additional arguments. The 
first argument is over whether or not the Palestinians left of their 
own accord or were forced out by their own leaders. This problem has 
already been discussed in earlier sections. The arguments, as noted 
before, say that Jews claim Arab leaders told the Palestinians to 
leave while Palestinians state they they left because of the occupation 
of Palestine by Jews during the war. 
Although some Palestinians did leave of their own accord 
before the war, it is most logical to assume that the majority of 
13 
Palestinians were forced out by the Israelis during the war. William 
Polk states his opinion: 
Although extensively a small-scale affair in comparison to 
European wars, the 1948-49 war was intensively one of the most 
disruptive in modern times. Upwards of 80 percent - about 800,000 -
of the Arab population of Palestine lost their homes, l~~ds, and 
cotmtry.17 
Polk's account of the Palestinians leads to the second argument 
between Jews and Palestinians. This dispute concerns the number of 
Palestinians that actually left Palestine. Jews say the number is very 
low, while Palestinians say that the number is quite high. A good 
example of this argument are the differences in the figures that Katz 
and Polk use. Katz believes that there were actually 5,000 or 6,000 
people who left Palestine after the war. 18 Polk's figures are much 
higher, he thinks there were 800,000 Palestinian refugees after the 
war.19 
Shortly after the war, the United Nations sent an agency into 
the Middle East to tend to these Palestinian refugees. The name of 
this organization was the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. 
This ~~ency set up camps for the refugees in countries such as 
Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. The plight of the Palestinian refugee 
was not good for, in addition to having been forced from his home, 
his new home, the refugee camps, were not very good. William Polk 
tells of the condition of the refugee camps: 
In the camps the refugees lived in a "deplorable material 
and moral situation". The most employable, the best educated, and 
the lucky found temporary or permanent homes in Iraq, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, Libya, or further afield; those who remained in 
14 
the camps lived in a limbo in which they initially gave up trying 
to control their destiny. Their condition was beyond desperation -
desperation is, after all, an emotion of one who still actively 
tries to control his fate.20 
The individual refugee in each camp received about 1,600 
calories from an insipid diet; which was enough to keep the refugees 
going physically, but their emotional and intellectual diet was less 
sustaining. 21 
The problem of poor conditions in the camps was complicated by 
the fact that the countries that hosted these camps did not receive the 
refugees with open arms. Jordan was the only country that welcomed the 
Palestinian refugees. Polk describes the attitude of the host countries 
toward the refugees: 
Dependent upon the United Nations for a monthly dole, they 
depended upon the inhabitants of the "host country" for everything 
else. Jobs were few and payment exploitative. Both pitied and 
resented, they competed for the available jobs and were a constant 
reminder of Arab weakness. Those in the camps in Lebanon needed 
but hated - and were used by but annoyed - the Lebanese.22 
The Palestinians were often used as a "political football" by 
the countries that harbored them. Samuel Katz believes that the govern-
ments of these countries inflated the figures on refugee rolls so that 
they would receive more money from the United Nations. He claims they 
did this by using the names of refugees who had died and of those who 
had returned to Israel or gone somewhere else. 23 
The conditions that were just described remained the way of life 
for most Palestinian refugees until the early 1970's, at which time a 
15 
number of different groups claimed to re~esent their cause. A full 
discussion of these groups will be undertaken in the next section. 
Finally, it can be seen that the history of the Palestinians 
from before the first Arab-Israeli War until the present day has been 
terribly disruptive. Disputes dominate this history. The questions of 
why the Palestinians left Palestine and who has a better right to 
Palestine, Jews or Palestinians, are just two of these disputes. 
The history of the Palestinian refugees has also been turbulent. 
Unwanted, and exploited by most of the countries they now reside in, 
these people truly do live in a state of limbo. Another important part 
of the history is the deep feelings among Jews and Palestinians. Their 
dispute is not just over land, it goes much deeper than that. These 
incredibly deep feelings will have to be taken into account by anyone 
trying to find a solution to the Palestinian Problem. 
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A TENUOUS BOND 
The relationship between the Palestinians and certain countries 
in the Middle East will be one of the topics of this section. This 
relationship can be termed a tenuous bond. The issue of representation 
of the Palestinian people will also be examined. Finally, recent 
diplomatic action by the United States concerning these two issues will 
be analyzed. 
The Palestinians and the Middle East 
All of the countries in the Middle East have a.11 interest in 
the Palestinian Problem. The degree of concern each country feels for 
the Palestinians determines how much support the Palestinians receive 
from individual Middle Eastern states. The internal situation present 
in these countries also dictates the amount of support that can be 
given to the Palestinians. 
Israel has the largest stake in the problem. The countries 
bordering Israel are also deeply concerned about the problem. These 
countries are Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Leba.11on. Saudi Arabia, Irao, 
and Libya also figure prominently. 
Most of these countries are host countries for Palestinian 
refugee camps maintained by the United ~ations Relief and Works 
Agency. Conditions in these camps have already been described. Looking 
18 
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at only these camps, however, is not enough. The Palestinian relation-
ship to Middle Eastern countries goes much deeper. 
The first country that will be examined is I!.!Q_. The super-
ficial aspects of Iraq's relationship with the Palestinians can be 
summed up this ways 
On the pan-Arab level, the most important territorial 
issue for Irao is that of Palestine and the lands under Israeli 
occupation since June, 196?. Iraq has persistently and uneouivo-
cally demanded a just solution to the Palestine problem.1 
Upon closer inspection, the true situation in Iraq comes to 
light: the Iraqi government has not been able to give much support 
to the P~estinian cause. There are two reasons for this. First, 
Iraq's internal squabbles between the Ba'ath government and Kurdish 
elements took un a lot of time and resources. 
Second, Iraq favors an organization that allows general Arab 
membership and participation to represent the Palestinians. This 
stance has isolated Iraq from other Arab countries. Most other Arab 
countries believe that the organization that represents the Palestinians 
should have Palestinian members only. 
The Palestinian-Iraqi relationship reached its nadir in 
September, 19?0 when Iraqi troops in Jordal'l did not help Palestinian 
commandos in their battle against the Jordanian government. Relations 
on all levels between the Palestinians and the Iraqis improved after 
the Iraqi government settled its differences with the Kurds. Pales-
tini~~s in Iraq were then granted rights, such as equal employment. 
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These moves were an indication of the general softening trend in the 
Iraqi government's attitude toward the Palestinians. The Palestinian 
issue once again became a secondary concern when the Iran-Iraq War 
began in September, 1980. 2 
Syria's support for the Palestinian cause is unquestioned. 
Syria, unlike other Palestinian supporters, devotes much more time and 
energy to their support. The depth of Syria's support can be seen in 
this passage 1 
The Syrian government has considered itself, and generally 
has been viewed, as the most consistent supporter of the Pales-
tinian cause. There is also an indissoluble link between the 
Palestinian issue and the larger Arab-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli 
questions. The questions Damascus has had to face in this area 
include the extent to which political support should be furnished 
to the Palestinian cause; the ends for which this support should 
be provided; the degree of military and logistical assistance to 
be provided ••• and, directly associated with each of these 
problems, the specific Palestinian groups to be supported.) 
The Palestinians do not, however, receive unlimited support 
from Syria. The Syrian government keeps close tabs on Palestinian 
activity by imposing many restrictions on this activity. The Syrians 
do not intend to lose control of their country to Palestinian commandos, 
as Jordan did in 1970. 
Syrian support for the Palestinian resistance did increase 
when Israel annexed the Golan Heights in December of 1981. The Golan 
Heights are a natural border between Israel and Syria. Prior to the 
1967 war, Syria held the Golan Heights, Israel captured and has ruled 
them as occupied territory ever since, Syria will probably escalate its 
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support of the Palestinian commandos even further in answer to the 
4 
annexation. 
Lebanon has been a. country torn by civil war and by the presence 
of a. foreign army within its borders. The civil war began in 197.5 and 
wa.s fought between Sunni and Shi' 1 te Moslems and I1aroni te Christians. A 
Palestinian resistance movement against Israel further complicated this 
si tua.tion. The Palestinians joined forces with the Moslems. Responding 
to this development, Israel began supporting the Maronite Christians. 
Syria. then sent its army into Lebanon, first to fight the Moslems and 
then to combat the Israeli-backed Christians. 
The civil war kept the Lebanese from maintaining strong control 
over Palestinian actions within Lebanon. Palestinian commandos were 
launching raids against Israel from bases in southern Lebanon. These 
attacks alienated the Palestinians from Moslems living in southern 
Lebanon. 'Ihe Shi 'ite villagers living there wanted to throw the 
Palestinian commandos out of the area • .5 
The presence of Palestinian forces in Lebanon has continually 
brought hardship to the Lebanese people. During the latter part of 1978, 
the Israelis launched ~~ armored attack that drove deep into Lebanon, 
all the way to the Li tani River. The headquarters of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization, in Beirut, was the target of an Israeli 
bombing mission in July, 1981. Most recently, Israel conducted air 
attacks on villages in southern Lebanon, Israel termed this attack a 
"retaliatory warn1ng", 6 
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Writing an article for Time Magazine, Roger Rosenblatt describes 
the birth of one Lebanese child. The child's name is Palestine. Pales-
tine's strange birth is just one example of the pain the Lebanese endure 
for the Palestinians: 
For want of a standard term, the doctor on the case called 
the delivery a "caesarean section by explosion". It occurred last 
July in Beirut, during an Israeli air raid on the Fa.khani Street 
P.L.O. offices, when Palestine's mother, nine-months p.regnant, 
rushed from her apartment house in an effort to escape the bombs. 
No one is certain what happened next, but when the bombing stopped, 
Mrs. Halaby was found dead in the rubble. 'Ihree meters away, 
still enveloped in the placenta, lay her new little girl.? 
Palestinia~s, however, were not the sole source of concern 
for Lebanon. The placement of surface-to-air missles in Lebanon's 
Bekka Valley by Syria also brought the specter of war w1 th Israel to 
Lebanon. 8 
Confusion caused by the civil war and the other problems 
Lebanon has had to face has created a love-hate relationship between 
the Palestinians and the Lebanese, The Lebanese hope the Palestinians 
regain their homeland, but the constant threat of Israeli attack 
has weakened the spirit of Lebanese support for the Palestinians. 
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Palestinian commandos are so entrenched in southern Lebanon that Jordan's 
* fate of September, 1970 could be relived by Lebanon in the near future. 
Egypt's backing of the Palestinian cause since the 1948 war has 
been sporadic and troubled. Directly after the 1948 war, Egypt's 
sympathy for the Palestinians was quite strong: 
Since the creation of Israel in 1948 and the ensuing 
expulsion-emigration of the Arab population from the area consti-
tuting the Jewish state, Egypt has consistently supported the 
"inherent" right of the Palestinian people to return to their homes 
and lands and to establish an independent political entity in 
Palestine. Always unequivocal in defending the rights of the 
Palestinians to regain their terri tory, Egypt has maintained 
relations with the various Palestinian organizations that have 
oscillated between cordiality and enmity.9 
The 1967 war created even stronger bonds between Egypt and the 
Palestinians. Good relations, however, eroded over the issue of who 
was to represent the Palestinians in negotiations. The methods used to 
* When Israel won the 1948 war, Jordan's fate became cemented 
to the fate of the Palestinians. Only Israel has been influenced 
more by the Palestinians than Jordan. Many of the Palestinians that 
fled Palestine during and after the war rushed into Jordan. Jordan's 
government made conditions as liveable as possible for the refugees. 
Israel's occunation of the West Bank and Jerusalem in the 
1967 war strengthened-the ties between Jordan and the Palestinians. 
The West Bank and Jerusalem had been under Jordan's control since 
shortly after the 1948 war. The splitting of the East and West 
Banks fueled a Palestinian resistance movement that had begun in 
1966. Palestinian guerrillas used Jordan as a base of operations 
for their attacks on Israel. 
Jordan, and her ruler, King Hussein, did everything possible 
to aid the guerrillas. Hussein was even thought to be one of the 
prime representatives of the Palestinian people. Disagreements over 
the raids into Israel soon brought Hussein and the Palestinians into 
conflict. Attempts to remove Hussein from power were made in 1970. 
The situation worsened so much that Hussein was forced to drive the 
guerrillas out of Jordan in September, 1970. The situation in 
Jord~ ir0september, 1970 will be discussed more fully in another sect~on. 
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redress Palestinian grievances were also hotly debated: 
As far as territorial issues are concerned, there is 
unanimity among the Egyptians: they are firmly committed to a 
complete recovery of the Arab lands occupied by Israel since 1967. 
The unaniznt{Y, however, does not extend to the means of achieving 
this goal. 
Differences with the different Palestinian groups have influ-
enced Egypt's domestic and foreign policy: 
These questions have not only created domestic dissension 
in Egypt but also have caused an occasional deterioration of its 
relations with Syria, Libya, Jordan, Iraq, and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization. r~ei ther the charismatic ~Jasser nor the 
pragmatic Sadat were able to create a domestic or a regional unity 
on these issues, which have remained the most ~nizing concern 
of the Egyptian people and their policymakers. 
Difficult domestic conditions in the early 1970's led President 
Sadat to rethink Egypt's foreign policy. Though Egypt's relationship 
with the Palestinia.'ls was of prime concern, Sadat believed he had to 
concentrate on Egypt's domestic problems before internal uprisings 
developed. Yet, instead of working on these problems, Sadat launched 
a surprise attack on Israel in October, 1973. The war was supposed to 
be a great Victory for Egypt which would allow Sadat to repair the 
troubled conditions in Egypt. 
Abraham Wagner details Sadat' s attitude toward using Egyptian 
resources to aid non-Egyptian groups, including the Palestinians, before 
and after the October War: 
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There are amnle indications that before the October War, 
Sadat wanted to turn inward and away from pan-Arab issues, such 
as Palestine, in order to concentrate his efforts on solving Egypt's 
social and economic problems. The pan-Arab issue, he believed, had 
deprived Egypt of vital resources desperately needed for domestic 
development. • ,Sadat, who is by no me~~ an isolationist, would 
prefer to expend his nation's scarce resources and energies in 
strengthening the economy rather than in encouraging the overthrow 
of regimes deemed unfriendly to Egypt.13 
Egypt's defeat in the October War convinced Sadat that violence 
was not the way to secure peace and prosperity for Egypt. The domestic 
situation was worsened by the war. Sadat believed that Egypt could not 
afford, either economically or emotionally, another war with Israel. 
Sadat's peacemaking journey to Jerusalem in November, 1977 was a direct 
res~t of this belief. Sadat hoped that his peace initiative would 
also help the Palestinians. The impact of Sadat's efforts on the 
Palestinians will be covered later. 
Israel's victory in the 1948 war precipitated the Palestinian 
Problem. Next to the Palestinians themselves, Israel has become the 
single most important entity involved in the search for a solution to 
the Palestinian Problem. Israel's importance to the problem rests in 
the fact that the land the Palestinians claim to be their home is now 
occupied by the state of Israel. 
Israel's treatment of the Palestinians in the occupied terri-
tories is also a matter of debate, Once again Samuel Katz and Edward 
Said have diverging opinions, Katz feels that Israel's management of 
the Palestinians in the occupied territories has been more than fair: 
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The Israeli government has also gone to great lengths, 
probably unprecedented in the history of military occupations, 
both to create an easy and relaxed relationship with the people 
and to improve their lot. From the beginning, it established 
the principle of not interfering with the tenor and manner of 
life and of the Arab population, with only two exceptions. First, 
it insisted on the political propaganda and ••• the second 
exception consisted in a considerable expenditure of money and 
effort and e~pertise to imnrove the economic condition of the 
population,! - -
Said's opinion of Palestinian life inside the occupied terri-
tories is less favorable than the one g1 ven by Katz. Said states 1 
There are Zionism and Israel for Jews, and Zionism for 
non-Jews. Zionism has drawn a sharp line between Jew and non-Jew: 
Israel built a whole system for keeping them apart, including the 
much admired (but completely apartheid) kibbutzim, to which no 
Arab has ever belonged. In effect, the Arabs are ruled by a 
senarate government premised on the impossibility of isonomic 
rule for both Jews and non-Jews.15 
Israel's occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Sinai has 
been a mixed blessing for Israel. One of the good things to come out 
of the occupation was an improvement in Israel's geographic security. 
The acquisition of the territories expanded Israel's borders which made 
the physical defense of Israel somewhat easier. A boost to Israeli 
morale was another plus provided by the occupation in 1967. 
\fhile Israel's security against external attack may have been 
imnroved by the increase in territory, her internal security has been 
greatly threatened by the occupation. The danger to Israel's security 
comes from the vast resources that must be expended on maintaining a 
force of occupation in the territories acouired in 1967. Financial and 
emotional resources must be tanped in order to protect the territories 
from attack by Palestinian guerrillas. 
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Management of the occupied territories has become a vicious 
circle for Israel. In order to protect Israeli citizens from Pales-
tinian attacks, which are in retaliation to the occupation, the Israeli 
army has become a force of occupation in these areas. The army kee~s 
tight control on the movement and political freedoms of Palestinians 
in these areas. Lack of political freedoms and freedom of movement 
lead the Palestinians to subversive action in Israel and give Pales-
tinian groups outside Israel justification to attack Israel in the name 
of their brothers inside Israe1. 16 
Thus, actions taken by Israel to enhance security really 
jeopardize that security. Israel's domestic problems, "a worsening 
economy, increases in taxes, inflation, unemployment, and emigration",!? 
coupled with her security concerns, could bring about Israel's collapse. 
For this reason and for the emotional well-being of her peo~le it 
behooves Israel to try and find a solution to the Palestinian Problem. 
Improving the quality of life of Palestinians in the occupied 
territories would go a long way toward paving the road to a solution. 
Opportunities for Palestinian education is a case in point as this 
descrintion of the Israeli school system demonstrates! 
Parents may send their children to either tyPe of public 
school--or to nrivate school, some of which are run by various 
Christian denominations. There is little co-education between 
Israeli Arabs and Jews. Educational attainment of the Arab 
population is ~uch lower than the norm, and the university dropout 
rate is high.t 
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Writing in Time Magazine, Otto Freidrich elaborates on the poor 
condition of Arab education in Israel: 
Though Arab and Israeli children now learn each other's 
l~~guages in Jerusalem classrooms, they still go to separate schools. 
Officials like to boast not only that many new classrooms have been 
built (152 last year) but that Arab schools are just as good as 
Jewish ones (and much better than what the Arabs had in the past). 
Separate but equal is what the doctrine used to be called in the 
u.s. and the Suureme Court condemned it forever by ruling that 
separate schools are inherently unequal.19 
Practices like these have instigated many Palestinian commando 
raids against Israel. Innocent Israeli families receive the brunt of 
the violence in these attacks. Roger Rosenblatt details the aftermath 
of one of these raids: 
Einat, 5, and Yael, 2, were both killed in April, 1979 
when terrorists entered ~ahariya from the sea in a motor-powered 
dinghy and attacked a four-story apartment house. In one apartment 
they found Einat and her father, whom they took back to the beach. 
Danny they shot to death and, when Israeli forces approached, one 
of the terrorists picked up Einat by the feet and cracked open her 
head on a rock. 
Yael died differently. When the terrorists burst in on 
their apartment, Semadar and Yael were in a utility room, where 
they remained in hiding. Yael started to cry. In order to keep 
her daughter quiet, Semadar clamped her hand over her mouth very 
hard. It is believed that she inadvertently suffocated the child. 
When the story was published, it drove the entire nation into 
profound mourning. There was Israel's history in a single incidents 
the nation continually at war; the nation as mother protecting her 
children; the nation unwittingly suffocating her young for the wars 
in which it was caught. 20 
A conversation Roger Rosenblatt had with a Palestinian named 
Nabil depicts the pain felt by Palestinians in the occupied territories. 
Nabil told Rosenblatt: 
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One night last year, for instance, three other boys and I 
were returning home from a dance. A jeep pulled up. The soldiers 
demanded our identity cards. Then they took us with them. I asked 
why - when we had our cards. I got slapped for that. We were 
taken to the military center, where we were made to lie down in the 
street. Then they transferred us to a cell about 1.5 meters high. 
You could not sit up. There was almost no air. My friend asked 
for water; he got sla!JPed for that. 'What makes :people behave this 
way?' I asked one of the soldiers. He said: 'We are not policy-
makers. We are just taking orders' . 21 
There will be no end to the mutual suffering the Palestinians 
and Israelis feel until a settlement of the Palestinian Problem has been 
reached. N'o settlement can be hoped for unless the final status of 
Jerusalem has been agreed upon. Jerusalem's status is another matter 
of great debate. 
While Jerusalem is of great importance to a settlement, its 
status is hardly mentioned in any discussions or documents. Lord 
Caradon, a member of the National Defense University, points this out: 
Jerusalem means the City of Peace. And in all the surround-
ing uncertainties, one thing cannot by disputed. There will be no 
peace in the Holy Land without a peace in Jerusalem. 
Yet the question of how peace can be achieved in Jerusalem 
is postponed, avoided, or neglected. In the Camp David concluding 
document Jerusalem was not even mentioned, 
No problem amongst the many disputes of the Middle East 
raises more difficulties, excites more deep emotions, or commands 
more intense loyalties than the question of the future of Je~salem, 
and no other danger is treated with such an ominous silence. 2 
Lord Caradon believes that there will not be a settlement to 
the Palestinian Problem and no ch~~ce for peace in the Middle East due 
to the debate over Jerusalem. Caradon says: 
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'Ihe fear is that intense feeling over the future of 
Jerusalem will increase animosities and stand in the way of a 
peaceful settlement, eventually bring about bloodshed and destruc-
tion on a scale not so far imagined, not only to the Holy City but 
to all those engaged in the conflict. 
What a tragedy it would be if Jerusalem thus became itself 
the impediment to peace, the central cause of continuing conflict.23 
Otto Freidrich echoes Lord Caradon's thoughts on Je~1salem's 
importance to peace in the Middle East: 
Of all the conflicts betw~en Jews a..'ld Arabs, that over 
Jerusalem is the most complex and intractable. It is so deeply 
rooted in centuries of political and religious strife that each 
side is ~sionately determined to have its way. As there is no 
settlement, every terrorist bomb on the West Bank contains the 
danger of escalation: rioting, warf~~· spreading oil cutoffs, a 
new confrontation of the superpowers. 
Passions reign high in the struggle over Jerusalem's future. 
Arab and Jews have drawn battle lines around their positions from 
which they will not budge. Teddy Kollek, the mayor of Jerusalem, 
presents the Israeli case: 
There are some Israelis who would give up the Gol~~. some 
Israelis who would give up the Sinai, and some who would give up 
the West Bank. But I do not think you can find any Israelis who 
are willing to give up Jerusalem. They cannot and will not. This 
beautiful, golden city is the heart and soul of the Jewish people. 
You cannot live without a heart and soul. If you want one sim'Ole 
word to symbolize all of Jewish history, that would be Jerusal~m.25 
Responding to Teddy Kollek, Walid Khalidi makes these remarks: 
Without East Jerusalem there would be no West Bank. It is 
the navel, the pivotal link between Nablus to the north and Hebron 
to the south. Together with its Arab suburbs, it is the largest 
Arab urban concentration on the !.fest Bank. It is the former 
capital of the sanjak (district) of Jerusalem under the Ottomans, 
as well as of mandatory Palestine. The highest proportion of the 
Palestinian professional elite under occupation resides in it. It 
is the site of the holiest Huslim shrines on Palestinian soil. .. It 
contains the oldest religious endowments of the Palestinians, their 
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most prestigious secular institutions - the cumulative and priceless 
patrimony of a millennium ~~d a quarter of residence, Architect-
urally it is distinctively Arab. In ownership and property, it ig 
overwhelmingly so. It is the natural capital of Arab Palestine.2 
Israel's dominant status in any settlement to the Palestinian 
Problem will remain solid as long as Jerusalem is under Israeli occupa-
tion. 'Ihe future of Jerusalem will have to be determined before any 
settlement to the Palestinian Problem can be found. Deep Arab and 
Jewish emotions toward Jerusalem make this task appear nearly impossible. 
Saudi Arabia's involvement in the Palestinian Problem is directly 
related to the importance of Saudi Arabia to the United States. The 
United States depends on Saudi oil and o~ the Saudi's politically 
moderate stance. Saudi Arabia is one of the few Middle Eastern countries 
with which the United States has been able to develop a good relationship. 
The loss of the Iranian ally has made the U.s. -saudi bond even more 
important to the United States. 
Anything that end~~gers the stability and security of Saudi Arabia 
is potentially devastating to the United States, The Palestinian Problem 
is one issue that could upset Saudi security and stability. Former 
President Richard M. Nixon makes this point very clears 
The Saudis are concerned that any settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict that does not resolve the Palestinian problem will 
increase the militancy of the Palestinians. In 1976 the Palestinian 
Liberation Orga.~ization disrupted Lebanon, plunging it into civil 
war. During my administration they tried twice within three months 
to assassinate King Hussein of Jordan, they set off a civil war in 
that country, and they almost succeeded in bringing about the fall 
of its government. Terrorism is the PLO's stock-in-trade, and 
Saudi Arabia is extremely vulnerable to terrorist activities; two 
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thirds of the workers in its oil fields are Palestinians. In 
addition, anything that strengthens the hand of the Arab radicals 
as an unsatisfactory settlement would weaken the ~sition of the 
moderate Saudi leadership.27 -
Saudi Arabia's value to the United States has been demonstrated 
in two recent incidents. First, the Saudis were "instrumental in 
helping the United States control the Syrian missile crisis in mid-
28 1981." Secondly, the Saudis were helpful "in arranging the related 
Israeli-Palestinian cease-fire in Lebanon in July, 1981."29 
Writing in his book, The Kingdom, Robert Lacey relates King 
Faisal's fear of the Palestinians: 
What worried him was the bitterness the Palestinians felt 
towards their brother Arabs. Desperate men with nothing to lose, 
the Palestinians had, within a matter of years, come to represent 
a major threat of any Arab regime which had not done enough, in 
their opinion, to help secure their rights. Placating them was 
more than a matter of morality; it was a question of survival.30 
The latest example of Saudi activism in the search for a 
settlement to the Palestinian Problem was Crown Prince Fahd's peace 
pro:posal in August, 1981. Fahd devised his plan as an alternative to 
the Camp David peace process, which he branded a failure.31 
Directly contrasting Saudi Arabia's moderate political positions 
is the Middle East's most radical state, Libya. Libya's leader, Muammar 
Gaddafi, is one of the most destabilizing factors in the Middle East. 
Libya's relationship with the Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization is quite dangerous to a peaceful settlement of the Pales-
tinian Problem. 
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Writing in the Armed Forces Journal International, Yossef 
Bodansky describes the Libyan-8oviet-PLO relationship: 
On this level of clandestine activities, the Soviet-
Libyan-FLO partnership is the most active. Libya allows PLO 
troops to train with conventional heavy weapons, particularly 
aircraft and tanks, which cannot be placed at their disposal 
anywhere else. In October, 1978, Arafat claimed that Palestinian 
squadrons stationed in Libya were operating r!ig-211 Mig-23 1 and 
Mirage 5 aircraft. Tank aD~ missile units are likewise placed at 
the disposal of the Fatah.J 
In addition to training and arming Palestinian guerrillas, 
Gaddafi has done much more to upset the delicate balance that barely 
holds the Middle East together. On August 19 1 19811 Libyan fighter 
planes attacked u.s. naval aircraft that were on maneuvers in the Gulf 
of Sidra. Gaddafi ordered the U.s. planes to be attacked because they 
had entered the Gulf of Sidra, which he claimed was inside Libya's 
200-mile territorial waters. The U.S. planes promptly shot down the 
Libyan aircraft. 
Some observers saw this action as "a deli berate U.s. provoca-
tion".33 Other observers feel that Libya instigated the action by 
attacking planes that were over international waters.34 
Gaddafi has also been linked to assassination attempts on 
Euro~an and American diplomats. There also are questions on Gaddafi's 
possible role in the assassination of Anwar Sadat. Finally, in 
December, 1981 u.s. intelliger.ce agencies received information stating 
that Muammar Gaddafi had sent hit teams to the United States to kill 
President Reagan and other top u.s. officials.35 
34 
The setting in the Middle East is volatile enough without 
Gaddafi's disruptive influence. Gaddafi's Libya threatens to ruin any 
possibility for a settlement to the Palestinian Problem. The atmosphere 
must be just right for negotiations of this kind and Libya's actions 
* continually muddle the atmosPhere. 
* For further discussions on the problems between Palestini~~s 
and Jews sees Politics in the Middle East by James Bill and Carl 
Leiden, The Near East by William Yale, and The Battle for Peace by 
Ezer Weizman. 
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PAlESTINIAN REPRESE~'TATION 
Representation of the dispersed Palestini~~ people has been a 
great question of debate since Israel's victory in the first Arab-Israeli 
War. The debate moves along a number of levels. First, the debate 
centered on which country or group should be the sole representative of 
the Palestinians. Once this was decided, the debate moved to another 
level. Now the question was how effective could the group representing 
the Palestinians be, if Israel and other states dealing with the Pales-
tinian Problem would not meet or even acknowledge that group as the 
representative of the Palestinians • 
• Prior to 1962, for the most part, there was no universal 
Palestinian entity. Palestinians living in refugee camns in different 
countries knew only the Palestinians in that camp or that country. 
T!hile the desire for return to Palestine may have been universal, there 
was no single movement, thought, or driving force that united the Pales-
tinians politically. 
Edward Said believes this lack of unity causes an identity 
crisis for Palestinians. He says: 
Each Palestinian community must struggle to maintain its 
identity on at least two levels: first, as Palestinian with regard 
to the historical encounter with Zionism and the precipitous loss 
of a homeland; second, as Palestinian in the existential setting of 
day-to-day life res~nding to the pressure in the state of residence. 
Every Palestinian has no state as a Palestinian even though he is 
"of", without belonging to, a state in which at present he resides.1 
J? 
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With the exce~tion of a few groups that made commando raids 
into Israel from Jordan and Lebanon in 1955, the Palestinians were 
"politically passive until about 1962". 2 
These military groups operated independently. There was no 
communication or organized plan between these early Palestinian groups. 
It was ~ot until the late 1950's and early 1960's that the need for a 
concerted effort develo~d and took form. Edward Said describes how 
the Palestinian consciousness was born: 
Limited in ~~se, cut off from one another, and clan-
destine, the groups defy the assemblage of an historical account. 
No documentary records give a view of their gradual transformation 
into political organizations. Indeed, we must look essentially to 
Arabic literature, to poetry and fiction to get some "feel" of the 
genesis of what later became the guerrilla movement. Put simply, 
what appears to have occurred is that the young, raised on a 
blurred memory of childhood, the tales of the elders, the sorrow, 
privation, and humiliation of refugee life, came to feel a new 
sense of romantic nationalism.3 
The Palestinians needed a model to follow before they could 
become engaged in an organized battle with the Israeli occupier. 
William Polk feels the Algerian Revolution is the model the Palestinians 
needed: 
What was it that brought into a single focus this nostalgia 
and partisan warfare? The most convincing answer, I think, was the 
distantly perceived exam~le of Algeria. 
The Algerian Revolution was adopted as a case study by those 
Franz Fannon called "The Wretched of the Earth" --and by those who 
opposed them. Fannon's own book became a clarion cry for radical 
organizations just as Colonel Roger T.rinquier's La Guerre Moderne 
became a guidebook on counterinsurgency warfare. In the Algerian 
resistance movement, then apparently also disaffected, leaderless, 
inchoate, and powerless, but beginning to achieve a kind of heroism, 
the Palestinians found a family resemblance.4 
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The first two grou:ps to become "the ouasi-official re!'resenta-
tives of the Palestinian peonle" were the Harakat at-Tahrir al-Falastini, 
or Fatah, ~~d the Palestine Liberation Organization, or PLO. Fatah was 
the first of the organizations to a:ppear on the scene. Fatah emerged 
in 1965, but was never generally recognized. 
The FLO, which became generally recognized as the representative 
of the Palestinian people by the Palestinians and most Arab states, 
started a little later. The ?LO was the creation of ~~ Arab summit 
conference held in Alexandria on September 15, 1963. The next s:pring, a 
group called the Palestine ~ational Congress met in Jerusalem to discuss 
the formation of the PLO, King Hussein of Jordan opened the meeting by 
promising that Jordan would provide carnns to train Palestinian guerrillas. 
Palestinians critized the PLO as an organization that did 
nothing more than soak u:p Palestinians to prevent them from acting 
effectively. Ahmad Shuqairi, the FLO chairman, was also criticized as 
a poor leader. Palestinians claimed he was a puppet of the Arab states 
that had created the PL0.5 
Palestinians believed that the true leader of the Palestinian 
neonle would have to be an independent, not connected with a particular 
Arab state. One such leader was Yasir Arafat. !Tilliam Polk describes 
Arafat's credentials: 
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The most significant of the Fatah leaders was Yasir Arafat. 
Unlike Shuoairi, he was not the "chosen instrument" of any Arab 
government. Of a poorer background, he had drunk the dregs of the 
bitter cuP of sorrow and humiliation. Able and energetic, he 
managed to acouire an education and to escape the camP life. Like 
many-of the Fatah personnel, he was technically oualified (as an 
engineer) but6had not risen to a position of prominence in another Arab country. 
The PLO's prominence grew after Israel's victory in the 1967 
war. More territory had been occupied by Israel, along with the 
Palestinians living on that territory. The inadequacy of the Arab 
armies against Israel was also very clear. The time had come for a 
new and vibrant pla.l'l of attack. Leadership for the Palestinian people 
was essential. 
Palestinians of the older generation wanted leadership to come 
from their own camps, interests, and local authorities. Younger 
Palestinians, however, thought the guerrillas of the PI.O and other 
organizations should provide the leadership for the Palestinia.l'ls. It 
was this difference of opinion between older and younger Palestinians 
that allowed the guerrillas to gain the UPper hand. 
Although by now most Palestinians favored the guerrillas, the 
guerrillas themselves were not united. Aside from the PLO and Fatah, 
two other groups gained importance after the 1967 war. These two 
groups were the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and 
Sa' iqah. Sa' iqah was a group of comma.l'ldos controlled by the Syrian 
army that operated from the Syrian and Jordanian borders. 
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The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was a con-
glomeration of three different guerrilla grouus. The leader of one of 
these groups, George Habbash, became the leader of the Popular Front. 
The Popular Front's radical social ideology separated it from the PLO 
and Fatah. 
Fatah was having the most luck with young Palestinians by the 
end of 1967. Support from Arab countries for the Palestinians was 
still split among the different groups. An Israeli raid in retaliation 
to Fatah attacks in Israel may have been the deciding factor as to 
which group would get Arab support. 
On March 21, 1968 the Israeli army attacked the village of 
Karamah, which was a Fatah staging area. Although the Israelis won 
militarily, Fatah pronounced the raid a psychological victory for the 
Palestinian cause. After this victory a Palestine National Council 
was called in May, 1968. The purpose of this council was to unify the 
guerrilla groups under one organization, the PLO, which would receive 
all Arab support. Fatah, the PLO, and Sa'iqah were the major groups 
that joined. The Popular Front was still having internal disputes 
over leadership and policies. This argument led some members of the 
Popular Front to leave and form the Popular Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine, which became part of the PLO. 
Fatah assumed leadershiu of the PLO in a 1969 PLO Congress in 
Cairo. The Pouular Front under George Habbash boycotted the Congress. 
Yasir Arafat was elected Chairman of the PLO and Fatah took control of 
42 
the organization. The Popular Front remained outside of the FLO until 
the group was forced to help the PLO battle the Jordanian army in 1970. 
Palestinian unification was almost complete. The guerrillas believed 
they were near becoming an "effective political community".? Their 
largest obstacle was the Jordanian government which began fighting the 
guerrillas. The fighting became heaviest in September, 1970, which 
became known as "Black September". The removal of the PLO from Jordan 
was a result of this action. 8 
The early 1970's were very important for the PLO. The United 
~ations voted to recognize the PLO on October 14, 1974. There were 
105 yes votes and 20 abstentions. Israel, the United States, the 
. 
Dominican Republic and Bolivia cast the only dissenting votes, Later 
that month, at a meeting of twenty Arab heads of state in Rabat, 
Morocco, the FLO was recognized as "the sole legitimate representative 
of the Palestinian people on any liberated Palestinian territory". The 
dates of this meeting were October 26-28, 1974.9 
The culmination of the FLO's efforts came on November 13, 1974 
when its leader, Yasir Arafat, addressed the U.N. General Assembly. 
This was a truly momentous occasion for "it was the first time that a 
10 
non-governmental organization had participated in an assembly debate." 
It would seem that after all that had happened to the PLO in 
the international arena a settlement to the Palestinian Problem could 
have been reached somewhat more easily. This was not to be, for Israel 
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would not deal with the PLO. Israel would rather deal with Jordan 
than the PLO. 
There are two main reasons for Israel's refusal to negotiate 
with the PLO. The first is that the PLO refuses to recognize the 
existence of the state of Israel. Secondly, Israel does not trust the 
PLO because of terrorist acts it has committed in the past. The killing 
of eleven Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich is just one 
example of terrorism conducted by the PLO. 
Before going any further into the actions of the PLO, it is 
important to learn something about terrorists in general. The first 
• 
question to be asked is why terrorists engage in activities such as 
bombings and airplane hijackings. 
According to Jan Schreiber, the terrorist believes his aggres-
sive actions are a reaction to someone else's aggression. Most terror-
ists view themselves as having been forced by events beyond their 
control to use violence. In the case of the Palestinians, this is 
especially true. If the PLO did not undertake operations that spread 
their actions across the front pages of the world's newspapers, their 
cause would remain relatively unknown outside the Middle East. Living 
without a state of their own hampers the Palestinians' ability to sell 
their cause to the world. Violence, however, has the opposite effect 
of turning people off of the cause of the group that uses violence. 11 
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In his book, The Ultimate Weauon, Jan Schreiber describes a 
tyuical terrorist. This descri~tion definitely covers members of the 
PLO. Schreiber states: 
In a world accustomed to nlacing more value on ends than 
means, the terrorist is the su~reme pragmatist. 11To deed is too 
brazen or too grisly, so long as it gets the job done: the change 
of social structure or the sought-after revolution. Like anyone 
who deals in the ~litics of power, he lives in a climate of moral 
ambiguity. Reknown as a ~articularly heartless victimizer, he 
often sees himself, by contrast, as society's victim, someone 
driven to commit certain a~palling acts by the blatant insensi-
tivity of the world to the needs and aspirations of the peonle he 
represents.12 .. -
While the FLO did engage in this kind of activity, the mission 
of the PLO has changed somewhat since it was accepted in the U. ~. 
Basically, the PLO is less militant now that it is trying a political 
solution to the Palestinian Problem. Schreiber says thata 
Clearly, however, by accepting potential political solutions 
and the help of the great powers in arriving at them, the PLO had 
committed itself to changing its image from that of unprincifled 
cutthroat to patriotic freedom fighter and peace negotiator. 3 
Terrorism and its inherent violence is destabilizing to world 
security generally and, in ~articular, to peace in the Middle East. 
The death and destruction terrorism brings to innocent peo~le the world 
over threatens to turn the different countries of the world into armed 
cam-ps. 
As noted earlier, the terrorism conducted by the PLO has brought 
great pain and anguish to many on both sides of the Palestinian Problem. 
The uncertainty, mistrust, and hatred caused by this terrorism has 
severely damaged the chances for a settlement to the Palestinian Problem. 
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Terrorism also upsets the ueaceful mainten~~ce of the superpower 
relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, As in any dispute, 
sides are taken in the Palestinian Problem, The u.s. sides with Israel 
and the Soviet Union w1 th the PLO. Were it not for its part in the 
Palestinian dispute, the Soviet Union would not have as firm a foothold 
in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. 
The Middle East and the Persian Gulf are not the only places 
the Soviet Union has used terrorist activity to its own advantage. 
Observers note that by supplying and training different terrorist groups, 
such as the PLO and Red Brigade, the Soviet Union can cause political 
disruption in areas it normally would have no influence, While using 
the genuine concerns of local terrorist organizations as bait, the Soviet 
Union lets these groups unwittingly accomplish tasks that would be 
nolitically harmful if conducted by Soviet forces, Responding to these 
charges, the Soviet Union claims that the CIA is really behind inter-
national terrorism. 
In his book, The Terror 1,!etwork, Claire Sterling disputes the 
Soviet claim and sets the record straight: 
Some have suggested that the CIA was egging on the enemy all 
along. A surprising number of people abroad still think there are 
no limits to the CIA's capabilities in this regard. I had no access 
at all to the CIA while gathering material for this book, since its 
agents were formally forbidden to talk to journalists abroad. I 
couldn't swear then that the CIA had no connection whatever with the 
planetary wave of terrorism described here, But it was certainly 
not the CIA that ran guerrilla training camps for tens of thousands 
of terrorists in Cuba, Yemen, North Korea, East Germany, Hungary, 
Czechoslov~~ia, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. The CIA could not 
have ~rovided, and evidently did not, the colossal supplies of 
weanons emnloyed by the terrorists of four continents in Fright 
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Decade I, or sanctuaries for their fugitives, or intelligence 
information for their oneratives, or diulomatic cover in the 
United ~.rations. 14 · · 
The FLO's refusal to recognize the existence of the state of 
Israel has stalemated the process leading toward a settlement of the 
Palestinian Problem. Israel, as well as the United States, will not 
deal with the PLO as long as it refuses to recognize Israel. In fact, 
~~y country or diplomat who even suggests talking with the PLO suffers 
the wrath of Israel and her proponents. President Carter's Ambassador 
to the United Nations, Andrew Young, is a case in point: 
Many blacks were outraged by what they perceived to be the 
forced resignation of Andrew YoQ~g as ambassador to the United 
Tl!ations in August, 19?9 for holding a co!1versation with the U. ~r. 
representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization. United 
States' ~licy, like Israeli policy, was to have nothing to do 
with the PLO Q~til it disavowed terrorism and recognized Israel's 
right to exist. After his resignation, Young made clear his 
oninio!1 that a prohibition on talking to the PLO carried this 
nolicy too far and ignored a nolitical reality in the Middle 
East,15 
Although the PLO must have been pretty successful to have been 
admitted to the United Nations, the effectiveness of this organization 
has been questioned. Once again, it is Samuel Katz and Edward W, Said 
that come down on different sides of the Palestinian fence. Samuel 
Katz questions the bravery of the PLO and of the support it received 
from Palestinians: 
Fatah onerations against Israel, first launched in 1965, 
were planned in Syria. The fighters first crossed into Jordan or 
sometimes into Lebanon and from there infiltrated directly into 
Israel. All the attacks were hit-and-run raids on civilian targets, 
and seldom did they stray far from the border. For Fatah members 
could not exnect shelter from the Palestinian Arabs, whether in 
Jordan-occupied Judea and Samaria or in Israel. With few exceptions, 
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the "Palestinian reople" were not involved at all, nor did they 
offer any substantial cooneration, even passive, in these oper-
ations,16 - -
Edward Said believes the PLO has been very successful and 
innovative for three reasonsa 
First, the PLO consciously undertook to be responsible for 
all Palestini~~s - those in exile, those under occupation, those 
inside Israel •.• Secondly, the PLO used its international authority 
to interpret the Palestinian reality, which had been obscured from 
the world for almost a century, to the world and, more important, 
to Palestinians themselves ••• Third, the PLO as a political organ-
ization was decisively orened on all sides to admit the entire 
community to its ranks.17 
The claim, that Palestinian terrorism is no better or worse 
than the terrorism used by Israelis against the British, is often not 
heard over the righteous indignation voiced by the Israelis. It should 
not be forgotten that Israeli terrorist groups such as the Haganah, 
Stern Grou~, Irgun and the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel launched 
raids and attacks against the British that were just as bloody as any 
conducted by the PLO against Israel in the 1960's. The bombing of the 
King David Hotel, in which ninety-one people were killed and forty-five 
wounded, is just one of the more explicit examples. The bombing was 
conducted by the Irgun, which was headed by Menachem Begin, the nresent 
Prime Minister of Israel. In light of his past, ~~Y complaints made by 
18 Begin about terrorist activities against Israel border on the ironic. 
Finally, in order to truly represent the Palestinian people 
effecti ve1y, the PLC Hi:!.l have to make some changes in its policy. 'The 
PIC will have to recognize Israel's right to exist and halt its acts of 
terror. Former President '!ixon gives his oninion of what policies the 
48 
representative of the Palestinians should follow: 
First, whatever group does in fact or claims to represent 
the Palestinians must recognize Israel's right to exist in peace 
and must reject the use of terrorism or armed action against Israel 
or Israeli citizens.19 
It remains to be seen if the PLO will heed President Nixon's 
* advice, 
* For a detailed analysis of the forms and causes of guerrilla 
and terrorist activity, see Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare edited 
by Sam C. Sarkesian. 
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'1l1E P ALESTBTI ANS Al!JJ nrE U.S • 
The P~estinian Problem has been a source of major concern for 
u.s. policymakers since the formation of the state of Israel. This 
nroblem became u.rominent during the Eisenhower administration and has 
intensified ever since. Although Secretary of State Dulles presented 
a ~lan for the settlement of the ~oblem in 1955, the Eisenhower admin-
istration was more concerned about Soviet involvement in the Middle East. 
Eisenhower believed that much of the instability in the Middle 
East was fomented by international communism under the direct control 
of the Soviet Union. In response to this belief the Eisenhower Doctrine, 
whieh called for U.S. military and economic assistance to countries in 
the Middle East as a means of countering Soviet policy in the area, was 
formulated by the administration and approved by Congress in March of 
1957.1 
Middle East ~licy did not change much during the Kennedy 
administration. One reason for this being that President Kennedy's 
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, had been a friend and admirer of John 
Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's Secretary of State. William Polk details 
the attitude of American Middle East ~licymakers: 
Moreover, the Department of State - both in the nerson of 
the Secretary and the officers at the "working level" - continued 
to hold the view of the American long-term interests and objectives 
in the Middle East which underlay the policy of the previous admin-
istration. The emphasis on military overflight rights, continuation 
of the flow of petroleum on acceptable terms to Europe, and, above 
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all, prevention of the real or ostensible incursion of the Soviet 
Union into the Mediterranean area underlay the oolicies of both 
administrations.2 -
Once again the Palestine Problem took a back seat to other 
consideratio~s. More importantly, the one plan that the Kennedy admin-
istration developed never got off the ground because the administration 
refused to face resistance from Israel and Jewish-American resista~ce 
at home. The plan, written by Dr. JosePh Johnson, met such strong 
resistance because it called for the voicing of ~eferences by the 
Palestinians and Israel would have nothing to do with the Palestinians. 
The lack of U.S. resolve in pursuing its plan is an example of American 
unwillingness to go against the wishes of Israel. This unwillingness 
is a problem that still plagues u.s. policy in the Middle East today.3 
President Nixon, who took office in 1969, viewed world events 
almost exclusively from the perspective of the U.s.-u.s.s.R. superpower 
relationship. Nixon's Middle East policy was therefore set in these 
terms. The Palestinian Problem once again became a matter of secondary 
importance. In addition to making U.S. Middle East policy take the 
wrong approach to the Palestinian Problem, Nixon's obsession with the 
Soviet Union led to the total ecliose of U.S. Middle ~astern policy by 
the attention given to the war in Vietnam and the opening of China. 
These two events were Nixon's means of combatting Soviet communism. 
Nixon and his National Security Affairs Adviser, Henry Kissinger, 
did not deal with the Middle East until events forced them to do so, 
Further wea~ening U.S. policy in the Middle East was the fact that 
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Kissinger was not directly involved. The conduct of u.s. policy in the 
area was left to Secretary of State William P. Rogers who was neither 
strong nor assertive. Kissinger's aggressiveness is what was needed 
for a viable u.s. nolicy in the Middle East. This difference in person-
alities led to many clashes in foreign policy until Kissinger later 
became both National Security Affairs Adviser and Secretary of State. 
In addition to differences in personality, there were also 
differences in the way the White House and the State Department viewed 
the situation in the Middle East. Writing in his book, Decade of 
Decisions, William Quandt describes these differences: 
The president and Kissinger seemed to be chiefly worried 
by the global ramifications of the Arab-Israeli conflict, r-rixon 
repeatedly used highly colored and explosive imagery in describing 
the area. Again and again the theme of confrontation between the 
superpowers was mentioned, 
The State Denartment professionals tended to agree that 
the situation i~ the Middle East was dangerous, but their per-
ceptions were more affected by the threats to United States' 
interests arising from trends in the area. At State, one heard 
of the "erosion" of American influence, of "deterioration" of '}j,he 
American position, of "radicalization", and of "polarization". 
Rogers and the State ~partment wanted to develop a new nolicy 
toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Busy with Vietnam and China, Nixon 
allowed Rogers to go ahead in the creation of a new Middle Sast policy. 
This policy became known as the Rogers Plan. Although the Rogers Plan 
if given a cha~ce might have brought a limited peace to the Middle Sast, 
it, like most other plans for peace in the Middle East, did not deal 
with the main cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict. American policymakers 
had not then learned and are just now realizing that the Palestinia~ 
Problem ;-r1.ll have to be settled before any comprehensive :!='.eace in the 
Middle 3ast can be established. 
The Jordanian crisis of September, 1970 was one of the few times 
U.S. policymakers and diplomats dealt with issues directly involved with 
the Palestinian Problem. Instead of aggressively seeking a settlement 
to the problem after the crisis, the United States entered a neriod of 
"standstill diplomacy" that lasted from 1970 to 1973.5 
Failure by the u.s. to pursue a vigorous policy in the Middle 
Sast, one that would lead to a return of the occupied territories and 
a settlement to the Palestinian Problem, created a pressure-cooker effect 
• in the Middle East. It exploded into war in October, 1973. Once again 
the United States and its Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, were nre-
sented with an opportunity to do something constructive in the Middle Sast. 
ifhen at last he did take over u.s. policy in the area, in 
response to the October War, Kissinger's choice of step-by-step diplomacy, 
while not settling the Palestinian Problem, may have created a situation 
that would allow negotiations on the problem to take place. Kissinger 
felt that, by taking different issues separately or one step at a time, 
a solution to the whole Arab-Israeli problem could be found. Kissinger's 
shuttle diplomacy hel,ed to nroduce some success in achieving his sten-
* by-sten nrocess. 
* This change of policy was a reaction to the gas lir.es result-
ing from OPSC's 1973 oil embargo, See The Middle ~ast: Oil, Politics 
and Develonment edited by John Duke Anthony for a detailed discussion 
of OPSC' s threat to U.S. interests in the !1iddle 3ast. 
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The main problem with Kissinger's policies was that they did 
not include the Palestinians, Policymakers believed that a settlement 
to the ~roblem could be reached after peace had been achieved. William 
Quandt describes this deadly fallacy: 
The United States has refrained from taking a clear 
position on the issues regarding the Palestinians. In view of 
their complexity, this may have been a reasonable posture in the 
short term, but at some point the United States will have to 
confront the ~uestion of Palestinian partici~ation in peace 
negotiations, 
The Carter administration, which took control in 1977, finally 
changed the American reluctance to deal with the ?alestinian Problem, 
The change in American nolicy is recounted by William Polk: 
The President realized that American Middle Eastern ~olicy 
had hit a dead end with the conclusion of the Sinai Accord in 
Se~tember, 1975 precisely because it had been designed to avoid 
the problem of the Palestinians. , .Carter had a remote sympathy 
for the Palestinians. What they said they wanted or he assumed 
they wanted made sense to Carter as a man concerned with human 
rights. 7 
According to Polk, "the Palestinian issue was one on which, 
a~parently, President Carter felt a personal, even a religious. commit-
ment."8 ?resident Carter felt so strongly about the Palestinians that 
he shocked everyone during a town meeting in Clinton,Hassachusetts. At 
this meeting President Carter announced the three conditions he felt 
were needed for neace in the Middle East. The first two were recogni-
tion of Israel's right to exist ~~d the establishment of nermanent 
frontiers. There Has nothing new about these conditions for they had 
been linch~ins of American policy for ouite a long time. It was 
President Carter's third condition, the need for a homeland for the 
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Palestinians had never before been ~art of an official policy of an 
American president. 
President Carter's beliefs were not ~~founded and his actions 
were soon to be rewarded. President ~~war Sadat made his historic 
journey to Jerusalem in Yovember, 1977. This visit led to the better-
ment of relations between Israel and Egypt. These new relations between 
Israel and Egypt led President Carter to ask Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin of Israel and President Sadat of E~t to come to Camp David for 
peace negotiations that would be mediated by President Carter himself. 
The negotiations at Camp David were unique. William Polk explains: 
The Camp David meetings were perhaps the most remarkable 
diplomatic event of this century. Quite a~art from the substance 
of the discussions, the fact that the heads of state from three 
states suspended all other activities for thirteen days was unprece-
dented. The informality of the meetings, contrasted shar~ly with 
the usual dinlomatic interchan~e in which formality and nrotocol 
were nearly as important as substance.9 -
The Camp David Accords, signed on Sentember 17, 1978, were made 
up of two se~arate documents. The first document was a "Framework for 
Peace in the Middle East", written mostly by President Carter, which 
set u~ the manner in which neace in the Middle East could be reached. 
Egy~t and Israel also agreed to the concluding of a peace treaty within 
three months of Camp David. The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was 
signed on March 26, 1979 at the White House. This treaty ended the 
state of belligerency between Israel and Egypt and dictated the start 
of normal relations between the two countries. 
57 
President Carter's "framework" document is far more interesting 
for it lays out the process by which the West B~~ and Gaza, Palestinian 
territories occupied by Israel, were to be dealt with. 'Ihe plan called 
for a five-year tra~sition period in which a self-governing authority 
would be elected by the people in these territories. Once this authority 
had been elected, Israel would remove its military government and 
civilian administration from the territories. This was to be done so 
that full autonomy could be given to the inhabitants of the terri tory. 
Jordan would also be asked to participate in the negotiations that would 
settle the arrangements for this transition period. 
The document also stated that Egypt, Israel, and Jordan would 
determine the ma~ner in which the elected self-governing authority 
would be established. :·regotiations to determine the '?QWers and resoon-
sibilities of the authority were also to take place. Palestinians from 
the West Bank and Gaza and any "other Palestinians as mutually agreed" 
could enter into these negotiations. 
The transition period would begin once the self-governing 
authority or administrative council was established. This period would 
last five years. By the third year of this transition period, negotia-
tions to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and to 
conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, are to be initiated. 
These negotiations are to be com~leted by the end of the transition 
period. ~gypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the 
i~abitants of the West Bank a~d Gaza would constitute the committee 
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that determines the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The com-
mittee to conclude the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan would be 
made up of re"Oresenta ti ves of Israel , Jordan and the inhabitants of the 
West B~~ and Gaza. 
The search for a self-governing authority has not yet ended, 
Autonomy talks between Israel and Egypt, for Jordan has not entered the 
negotiations, have made little if any progress. The Camp David Accords 
did bring about a separate peace between Israel ~~d Egypt. but they now 
can be no more than a guide for ~~y settlement of the Palestinian 
Problem. Unless drastic measures are taken by the U.s., the Cam-p David 
Accords will become just another miserable attemnt at settling the 
'!'I'Oblem. 
Before discussing the inadeouacies of the Camp David Accords 
and making any suggestions on what U.S. policy should be toward the 
Palestinian Problem, the Reagan administration will have to be examined. 
President Reagan, like other presidents before him, views the 
world in terms of the U.s.-u.s.s.R. superpower relationship. Reagan, 
however, lets this view rule his policies to a greater extent than any 
previous president. Alexander Haig, Reagan's Secretary of State, shares 
this view. Together they intend to form a "strategic consensus" in the 
Middle Bast to protect American interests by keeping the Soviets out. 
Walid Khalidi examines Haig's attitudes toward the Middle East: 
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But the predomin~~tly geonolitical lens through which he 
views the ~riddle East can only heighten concern. jH thout as yet 
having scrutinized the contents of the ~iddle East box (including, 
inter alia, the Palestine nroblem and the Arab-Israeli conflict), 
~.r. Haig nronoses to wra-p it in a "strategic consensus" between 
the Israelis- and the Arabs in the face of the u.s.s.R.10 
Reagan and his policymakers' efforts to form a "strategic 
consensus" against ~~e Soviet Union will delay, if not derail, other 
efforts being made to settle the Palestinian Problem. A closer relation-
ship with Israel will undoubtedly be the result of this "strategic 
consensus". According to Khalidi, "All this appears to indicate the 
Palestinian issue has been shelved by the Reagan Administration." 11 
These !'Qlicies could not have cow;: at a worse tine and be so 
harmful to American interests. Reag~l"l thinks that "shelving" the 
Palestinian Problem and forming a "strategic c01·~sensus" with Israel 
will enhance and protect u.s. interests. Ironically, the opposite is 
true. By putting the Palestinian Problem aside, Reagan is in reality 
clearing an open path into the Middle East for the U.S.S.R. Increased 
U.s. sup!X)rt of Israel at this time will also be harmful instead of 
hel!'ful to Amertcan interests. 
Walid Khalidi explains the effect non-resolution of the Pales-
tinian Problem and u.s. sup~rt of Israel has had on the Arabs, u.s., 
and U.s .s .R.: 
(1) They have resulted in the deepening and perpetuation 
of Arab political alienation from the iiest ••• American sponsorship 
of Israel and a perceived unwillingness to solve the Palestine 
problem largely counterbalanced the positive effects of decoloniza-
tio'!". on Arab-\-l'estern relations, 'd'i th West European colonial disen-
gagement completed, the onus of the non-resolution of the Palestine 
problem was shifted increasingly to the United States, 
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(2) At the same time, the attractiveness of Soviet military 
and di~lomatic help has increased in proportion to American backing 
of Israel. In fact, the Palestine problem provided the main Soviet 
entree into the Arab world. 
(3) The non-resolution of the Palestine problem has 
su~plied the most powerful motivation (and rationalization) for 
continued (Arab) reliance on the U.S.S.R. 
(4) Western military support of Israel has led to Soviet 
military support of the Arabs, The vicious circle this established 
has reinforced the Arab emotional and intellectual tilt in favor of 
the Soviets, especially with the younger generations,12 
In light of this &.'lalysis, it can easily be seen that Reagan's 
Middle Eastern policies are counterproductive, u.s. policy and diplomacy 
in the !1iddle East has generally been shortsighted and, at times, self-
defeating, This is especially true with policy concerning the Palestin-
ian Problem. The problem with America's policy in the Middle East is 
that it is not based on the most important factors present in the Middle 
East, William R. Polk describes on what the main lines of American 
policy in the Middle Sast are baseds 
In large part, they were inherited from Great Britain, 
transferred from other areas, or grew out of American domestic 
attitudes; only in small part were they adjusted to or in resonance 
with the hopes and fears of Middle Easterners. Therein lies much, 
but not all, of the cause of their shortfalls and disappointments. 
Too little did Americans perceive the Arabs and too little did the 
Arabs perceive Americans, f~ cushion our joint passage through the 
stormy postwar generation. 
The main problem with U.S. policy and diplomacy in the Middle 
East has been a failure or unwillingness to recognize the fact that 
there could not be any peace or security in the Middle Sast until a just 
settlement to the Palestinian Problem has been fOQ'ld. 
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The only way to end the threat of Soviet involvement in the 
Middle East is to eliminate the justification for Soviet presence in 
the area. This justification, as aptly demonstrated by Walid Khalidi, 
is the non-resolution of the Palestinian Problem and the blind support 
of Israel by the U.s. 
President Reagan and his policvmakers must realize that shying 
away from the Palestinian Problem is the worst thing that can be done. 
The time has come for some immediate and drastic moves by the U.s. to 
get the problem settled. These moves will be drastic because they will 
not be what Israel would wish us to do. u.s. policy must start dealing 
with the Middle East as a whole, without again allowing Israel to become 
an albatross. American acquiescence to every whim of Menachem Begin and 
Israel must end if U.S. interests in the area are to be ~rotected. 
America's position in the Middle East can be enhanced only if 
the u.s. makes its own foreign policy instead of letting Israel decide 
what policies the u.s. should follow. There are many things Israel is 
doing that endangers peace in the Middle East that the U.s. should be 
speaking out against. Begin's decision to make Jerusalem the capital 
of Israel, the increasing number of settlements in the West Bank and 
Gaza, the illegal use of American planes sold to Israel to bomb the 
Iraqi reactor, and the annexation of the Golan Heights are just a few 
examples. 
The u.s. should have policies designed to punish Israel when 
acts such as these are committed. The use of American planes in the 
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bombing destruction of the Iraqi reactor is a special case in point. 
The agreement between the u.s. and Israel that allowed the sale of the 
nlanes said they could be used for defensive purposes only. The bombing 
can in no way be construed as anything but an offensive act. The bomb-
ing, therefore, was 1~ violation of American law and Israel should have 
been punished. 
u.s. support of Israel is important and the U.S. should not 
a bandon Israel, but this support should not go to the extent that it 
handcuffs u.s. actions, as it does now. Charles McC. Mathias gives one 
reason why u.s. policymakers are reluctant to go against Israel: 
American Preside~ts, and to ~~ even greater degree Senators 
and Representatives, have been subjected to recurrent pressures from 
what has come to be known as the Israel lobby, For the most part 
they have been responsive, and for reasons not always related either 
to personal conviction or careful reflection on the national inter-
est ••• It is rather to suggest that, as a result of the activities 
of the lobby, congressional conviction has been measurably rein-
forced by the knowledge that nolitical s~~ctions will be applied by 
any who fail to deliver ,14 - ·-
John C. Campbell pinpoints the problem with non-resolution of 
the Palestini~~ Problem: 
The Palestine ouestion remains a formidable obstacle and 
burden to u.s. relations with the Arab world. It undermines the 
moderates and strengthens the wild men. It plays into the hands 
of the Soviet Union. It threatens to isolate the United States 
with Israel as the only friend in the region. A settlement may 
not be possible; nor can we assume that a settlement, if reached, 
would end Arab-Israeli tension or tr~~sform America's relations 
with the Arab world. Yevertheless, the effort must be made. 15 
The u.s. has to make this effort now, before the situation in 
the Middle East becomes so untenable that another war breaks out. There 
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are a. number of things the U.s. must do to get the negotiations on the 
settlement of the Palestinian Problem going again. The U.S. must 
encourage and actively seek the ~artici~a.tion of Jordan and the Pales-
tini~~s. including the PLO, in these negotiations. The PLO must be 
brought into the discussion whether Israel likes it or not. The u.s. 
will have to prevail over Israel in the short term for the benefit of 
long-term ~ea.ce and security, John c. Campbell explains: 
The terms, of course, have to be negotiated by the ~arties, 
~rincipally Israel, Jordan and representatives of the Palestinians 
(not excluding the PLO), ~~d that rea~res a. major endeavor to get 
those parties talking to each other,! 
The Israelis argue that they will not negotiate with the FLO 
because of.its coven~~t which denies the legitimacy of the state of 
Israel. Kha.lidi believes the "Coven~~t is ma.xima.list, u."U'ealistic and 
no basis for a settlement."17 He also points out that the PLO has 
softened some of its positions, especially those regarding armed 
struggle and the formation of a ministate within the post-1967 occupied 
territories, 18 
Khalidi also correctly suggests that the Europeans could be 
used by the u.s. in its attempt to get the PLO to enter the negotiations. 
He says: 
The Europeans could constructively focus attention on the 
two princi-ples of "reci:!'I'ocity" and "coexistence" - the leaven for 
a modus vivendi. They could draw out the PLO and the Arab radicals 
on what they have been im-plying. They could elicit from Israel 
responses, however guarded, about what in the circumstances it 
might contemplate, Should the ~uroneans collectively ascertain 
the nrenaredness of this or that nrotagonist to exchange recinrocal 
assurances on the basis of coexistence, this should be welcome news. 
The United States might fi~d the information worthy of building on,19 
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The next sten American nolicy should take is to draw Jordan 
into the negotiations. Jord~~·s refusal to enter the negotiations has 
been greatly debated. One reason for this refusal is that Jordan 
believes the Camp David Accords are a sellout to Israel: 
To the Saudis and other moderate Arabs (Jordan) the general 
framework document that emerged from the summit delegations was at 
best a repackaged version of Begin's limited autonomy plan, with no 
promise of any fair expression of self-determination for the inhab-
i~~ts of the conquered territories. Begin confirmed their sus-
picions in a speech in New York City immediately after Camp David 
that seemed to rule out any meaningful exercise of self-determination 
at the end of the agreed upon five-year transition period,20 
Ian Lustick believes that Jordan has very good reasons for not 
joining the negotiations. He believes that Jord~~ does not want to have 
anything to do with control of the tfest Bank or "the reintroduction of 
800,000 West Bank Palestinians into the Jordanian political arena". 
Lustick also noints out that Jordan's domestic situation has improved 
since the PLO was removed in 1970 and that King Hussein does not want 
them back. Lustick states: 
In fact, it has become increasingly clear that the exis-
tence of a growing Palestinian majority on the East Bank is the 
Hashemite regime's single most dangerous problem and that Israel's 
continued o~fupation of the West Bank is the regime's most impor-
tant asset. 
By not joining the negotiations, Jordan has also not been 
subjected to the same isolation from the Arab world that Egypt has. 
Taking all these factors into account, Lustick feels that the prospects 
for bringing Jordan into the negotiations are not good: 
Althou~h 4ussei~ would be hard pressed not to accept return 
of the entire '1Test Bank, including East Jerusalem, the risks of 
accenting anything less are so high a com~omise ~obably will 
reouire a unilateral Israeli willingness to permit the establish-
ment of a Palestinian homeland in the occupied territories. For 
Hussein would regard a Palestinian entity independent of Jordan as 
a more dangerous threat to the stability of the East Bank than a 
Palestinian homeland established under the auspices of, ~d closely 
monitored by, the Hashemite kingdom. For the foreseeable future 
the ~ice of luring Jordan into a settlement will be higher than 
~~y government in Jerusalem is likely to be willing or able to 
":>ay,22 
Jordan's importance in the negotiations is readily apnarent. 
With the exce"Ption of the Sinai, most of the terri tory Israel has 
occu'!)ied since 1967 was Jordanian. Bl Hassan Bin Talal also claims 
that the Jordal"!ians and the Palestinians "are !low one people". Any 
settlement involving the Palestinians will be of great concern to 
Jordan. 
Sl Hassan Bin Talal gives some reasons for Jordan's concern: 
(1) Half Jordan's oo-oulation is Palestinian. 
(2) The West Bank and Sast Jerusalem, both captured by 
Israel in 1967, were part of Jordan. 
(3) If there is large-scale Palestinian migration as a 
result of any regional settlement, Jordan will necessarily be 
greatly affected. 
(4) Virtually all Palestini~~s currently resident in 
Jordan are Jordanian nationals.23 
For these reasons Jordan must enter the negotiations. This is 
in direct contrast to Ian Lustick's beliefs on Jordan's willingness to 
negotiate. Talal says: 
\ve have seen that Jordan is central to any Arab-Israeli 
settlement, that Jordanian views must be very seriously considered 
if any initiative is to have a chance at success. Yet lately we in 
.Jordan have begun to hear and read that "Jorda!1 o-oooses an Arab-
Israeli settlement". Let us be clear on this noint: !".O one. no 
country, no -oeople wants a settlement more than we do. Certainly, 
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no one ~ays a heavier urice4for the continuation of the co~flict than we do here i~ Jordan.2 
The ultimate settleme~t to the Palesti~ian Problem will have to 
come in the form of either an indenendent Palestinian state in the West 
3ank and Gaza or a Palestiniar-Jordanian state in the same area. The 
indenendent Palestinian state is the best answer. Israel opposes this 
solution on the grounds that it cannot give up the occunied territories 
for security reasons. The Israelis also say that an independent Pales-
tinian state bordering Israel would be a security threat. 
Israel's security concerns have to be taken into account but 
giving un the. West Bank and Gaza ~nd allowing a Palestinian state to 
be set un there would not be as dangerous as the Israelis believe. In 
fact, giving un the West Bank and Gaza would be beneficial to Israel. 
Ian Lustick describes the nroblems caused by Israel's continued occu-
nation of these territories: 
Indeed, the greatest strai~ on Israel will be the exnen-
ditures that will be necessary to maintain Israel's defense posture. 
as long as Israeli control over the West Ba~k and Gaza continues. 
Retention of these areas will ureclude achievement of a com~e­
hensive neace agreement with Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and 
will drive Israel to maintain ~n increasingly costly military 
machine.25 
Lustick also nuts Israeli concern over the creation of an inde-
nendent Palestinian state into the proner nersnective: 
The Israeli concern is understandable but overstated. 
Bordered by Israel with its enormous qualitative military su~ri­
ority on the one side and by Jordan with its own interests and a 
larger nonulation on the other, a tiny Palestinian state would not 
nose an unmanageable threat to its neighbors, esnecially if it were 
demilitarized or if the arms it did nossess were contracturally 
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limited and mo~itored. Since the West Bank and Gaza are not 
economically viable, a Palestinian state would also be weakened 
by its de~ndence on outside economic su~port.26 
This information leads to the conclusion that Israel wants to 
hold onto this land for other than security reasons. In reality 
Menachem Begin and his ~erut Party will not give up the West Ba~~ and 
Gaza, which they call Judea and Samaria, for religious and historical 
reasons. They feel that these areas are a part of the biblically 
promised "Comnlete Land of Israel". 
The u.s. must now get negotiations moving again, but using the 
Camu David Framework only as a guide and not as the ultimate goal of the 
negotiations. Israel must stou its uolicy of creating new settlements. 
One way to ensure that Israel sto~s creatin~ new settlements in the 
West B~~ and Gaza is for the U.S. to begin what Lustick calls a policy 
of "dissociation". 
Under this policy the u.s. would no longer be associated with 
Israeli policies that are harmful to the settlement of the Palestinian 
Problem. The u.s. would punish Israel by making sure that economic aid 
to Israel would not be used to create new settlements or harden old ones. 
At the same time the U.S. would not discontinue military aid to Israel. 
This "dissociation" would be hel~ful because it would force Israel to 
ston nla~s for future settlements and remove the stigma attached to the 
U.S. by the Arab world for America's continued suunort of all Israel's 
27 nolicies. 
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Lustick's pl~~ is good as far as it goes. The u.s. should 
definitely "dissociate" itself from Israel's aggressive policies. Mon-
itoring and limiting U.S. economic aid to make sure it is not used for 
building new settlements is not enough. Instead the U.S. should hold 
back a percentage of uromised economic and military aid for every new 
Israeli settlement that has built i~ the West Bank and Gaza since the 
Camn David Accords. This nolicy should also extend to the hardening or 
imnroving of settleme~ts already in nlace. 
Next the u.s. should present at least a tentative ~lan for an 
inde~endent Palestini~~ state in the now-occu~ied territories of the 
West Bank ~~d Gaza. This ~lan should also include a section on _the 
final status of the city of Jerusalem. The U.S. should lean toward the 
internationalization of the city. 
The U,S, also has to go beyond Walid Khalidi's suggestion of 
letting the Euro~eans contact the FLO. The U.S. has to communicate 
with the PLO directly, If the U.S. does all of these things, Jordan 
would be able to enter into negotiations and conclude a neace treaty 
with Israel. 
After the successful imnleme~tation of this new American policy. 
the road to a settlement of the ~alestinian Problem would be clear. 
The uroblem is that the U.S., Israel, and the other narties involved 
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must realize and accent the fact that there are no easy naths to a 
* settlement of the uroblem. 
* If U.S. nolicy does not achieve a settlement to the ?ales-
tini~~ Problem soon, the Middle Sast will nrobably be thrown into 
yet another war. This time active involvement by U.S. troops is 
very likely. For an excellent discussion of u.s. nolicy in this 
kind of conflict, see U.S, Policy and Low-Inte~sity Conflict 
edited by Sam c. Sarkesian and !Jilliam L. Scully. 
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CONCLUSION 
Reaching a settlement to the Palestinian Problem should be the 
major concern of u.s. Middle Eastern policy and diplomacy. Although 
settling the Palestinian Problem would probably not totally end the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, tensions in the area would be greatly reduced. 
U.s. relations with the countries in the Middle East would be vastly 
improved if the problem was settled. This is especially true if these 
countries are willing to accept a positive and dynamic u.s. role in 
reaching this settlement. 
Israel would also benefit greatly from a settlement accepted 
by all the pa.rties involved. If Israel negotiated in good faith and 
agreed to allow the formation of an independent Palestinian state in 
the West Bank and Gaza, all the other Arab countries would join Egypt 
in recognizing the right of the state of Israel to exist. 1 This recog-
nition has been one of Israel's major concerns since 1947. Israel's 
territorial concerns, which are based on worries about security, would 
become a moot issue. Israel's present enemies would cease being hostile 
once the Palestinian Problem has been settled. Giving up the West Bank 
and Gaza to the Palestinians would also remove the heavy burden of 
occupation from Israel's strained resource~. 
Egypt's position in the Arab world, which has suffered greatly 
since the signing of the Camp David Accords, would also vastly improve. 
Egypt has been isolated from the Arab community due to the actions of 
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the rejectionist front which opposes Egypt's participation in the Camp 
David Accords. Settling the Palestinian Problem would end the reason 
for this isolation. 2 
The non-resolution of the problem also led to the assassination 
of Anwar Sadat ~~d is one of the prime problems influencing the stability 
of President Hosni Mubarak's new regime, Resolution of the problem 
would better bo~~ Mubarak's domestic and externa~ positions. According 
to Stanley F. Reed, the TJ. S. "has an overriding interest in Mubarak • s 
survival". Helping to achieve a settlement to the Palestinian Problem 
would ensure his survival. J 
The U.S. must remember two things about the Paiestinian Problem. 
First, the problem must be settled very soon, All of America's diplo-
matic resources in the Middle East must be used to reach a settlement. 
Second, there is no short cut to a settlement. Unpopular policies will 
have to be made and implemented, These policies may seem less th~~ 
desirable in the short run but will turn out to be best in the long run. 
President Reagan's plan for a "strategic consensus" will have 
to wait. Putting his plan aside for the moment is good for a counle of 
reasons. First, bY. putting all U.S. dinlomatic efforts into reaching 
a settlement, the settlement would probably be reached. With the end 
of the Palestinian Problem would also come the major justification for 
Soviet presence in the Middle 3::ast. Reagan's "strategic consensus" 
would, therefore, be unnecessary. 
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Finally, increased U.S. military presence in the area w1 thout 
a resolution to the nroblem would be harmful to both the U.S. and its 
moderate Arab allies such as Saudi Arabia. In his article, "Don't 
4 Engulf the Gulf", Christo:pher Va.'"l Hollen makes this :point very clear. 
In order to achieve a settlement, the u.s. should immediately 
embark on the following policy. The u.s. needs to convince Israel to 
end its policy of creating new settlements and annexation. Getting 
Israel to give un the West Bank and Gaza so an independent Palestinian 
state could be formed is also important. The u.s. can make sure these 
things happen by using the policy of holding back aid if new settlements 
are created. 
All of this also means that the Camp David Accords will no 
longer be used as the ultimate goal for the settlement of the Palestinian 
Problem. The final status of Jerusalem should also be resolved. The 
u.s. should try to convince the parties concerned that making Jerusalem 
an international city is the best thing for all sides. 
Eringing Jordan into the negotiations and keeping Zgy:pt in them 
is also a matter of great concern for ~.S. diplomacy, If the U.S. can 
stop Israel's annexationist policies, S~~t and Jordan will both become 
permanent parties to the negotiations. Egypt demands the freezing of 
the establishment of new settlements and a lifting of the ban on freedom 
of expression in the \.fest Bank and Gaza. 5 
Jordan has virtually the same objections to Israeli policy which 
keep it from joining in the negotiations. The absence of the reryresentative 
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of the Palestinian people, the PLO, also disturbs Jordan. The U.s. 
will also have to actively seek PLO participation in negotiations 
leading to a settlement. There can be no settlement without :participa-
tion by Jordan and the PLO. 
In addition to pursuing the policies already mentioned, the 
u.s. should attempt to enlist the aid of the United Nations in its 
quest for a solution to the Palestinian Problem~ The United Nations 
could be helpful in a nUJiber of ways. First, the United Nations could 
offer the use of a multinational peacekeeping force to be deployed 
along the border o'f Israel and the new Palestinian state. This peace-
keeping force should do much to allay Israeli fears concerning security. 
Secondly, the UN could follow a different path and become more 
vehement in its opposition to Israeli infractions of UN Resolution 242. 
Every time Israel adds a new settlement or takes over more territory, 
such as the Golan Heights, the UN could impose serious sanctions on 
Israel. 
Finally, the UN could serve as a meeting place and instigator 
of talks between the u.s., PLO, and all other parties involved in the 
Palestinian Problem. The fact that these talks were taking place under 
the auspices of the United Nations could take away some of the perceived 
stigma associated with them. 
U.S. diplomats could use the UN as a counterbalance to their 
reluctance to use policies that apply pressure on Israel. The u.s. 
?6 
could also volunteer sections of the u.s. J.r-.y to become the peacekeeping 
force already mentioned. u.s. forees could be used in auch the sue way 
as they are now in the Sinai. This could be done if the UN does not 
provide the force or as a means of getting the UN to become more aeti vely 
involved. 
Finally it must be noted that due to the many inherent complex-
ities found in the Middle East, no solution to the Palestinian Problem 
will be easy to reach. Sacrifice and accollJiodation will have to be the 
key actions tor all parties involved. The problea and the tensions that 
created it have existed for a long time. None of these things can be 
expected to disappear with the snap of a finger or overnight. A solution, 
however, can be reached and the U.S. JnUSt take an aeti ve role in finding 
it. 
The importance of an active role by the U.S. is clear for it is 
obvious that the u.s. has a nUilber of interests in the Middle East, the 
two most important being oil and keeping the Soviet Union out. Some may 
think that a u.s. policy that concentrates solely on the Palestinian 
Problem leaves other U.S. concerns unattended. This is not true for 
none of the other interests of the u.s. can be enhanced or protected 
until the situation in the Middle East can be brought under control. 
U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East can be likened to the economy. 
Quick fixes which appear helpful in the short term are really harmful 
to long-term recovery. There can be no quick fixes in U.S. Middle 
Eastern policy either. The u.s. must announce its goals and policies 
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to settle the Palestinian Problem and stick to them. Peace and security 
for the Middle East, the United States and pos&ibly the whole world 
depends on this. 
• 
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